.jpg)
Pages of History
On Dec. 7, 2025, we marked the 84th anniversary of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. The attack had the effect of bringing America into the war that had been raging in Europe since September 1939.
Shortly after the attack, a commission was set up by President Roosevelt to determine who was responsible for the apparent lack of preparedness that allowed the attack to happen.
The Roberts Commission of 1941-42 pinned the blame on General Walter Campbell Short, commander of the U.S. Army forces in Hawaii, and Admiral Husband Edward Kimmel, commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific fleet.
Kimmel had been in charge of the Pacific Fleet only since April 1941 when Admiral James O. Richardson was relieved of command for disagreeing with Roosevelt’s decision to move the fleet from San Diego to Pearl Harbor where it would be more difficult to supply and defend in the event of war.
Both Kimmel and Short were charged with dereliction of duty but it was decided to postpone court-martial proceedings until after the war. Unlike Japanese officers who most likely would have committed suicide following such charges, Kimmel and Short both protested their innocence. In late 1945 and early 1946 Kimmel and Short were called to testify before a joint Senate-House committee set up to determine responsibility for the Pearl Harbor debacle.
The national news section of the Advocate of Feb. 6, 1945, reported that both Kimmel and Short told the committee that the War Department’s decision to withhold intercepted Japanese messages did not permit either of them sufficient time to prepare for the December 7 attack.
By 1946 it was known that the Japanese diplomatic code had been broken before Pearl Harbor. Kimmel contended that some of these decoded messages told when and where Japan would probably strike. Kimmel also told the committee that he was not informed of a message intercepted on October 9 showing that Tokyo had divided Pearl Harbor into five sub-areas and was seeking information about the berthing of ships in those areas.
Kimmel stated had he known what Washington knew between Nov. 27 and Dec. 7, he would have ordered the fleet to sea. Without this crucial information, he decided to keep the ships moored in the harbor where he felt they would be safer without aircraft carrier support. Ships in the harbor, he said, would have some protection from land-based antiaircraft guns. At sea they would have none. Kimmel told the committee he did receive a message warning of the possibility of war from Admiral Harold Stark, Chief of Naval Operations, on Nov. 27, but the message was misleading. “No reasonable man could have interpreted Admiral Stark’s message as a warning of an imminent attack on Pearl Harbor. Instead the message pointed to the likelihood of an attack somewhere in Southeast Asia.”
About the same time Kimmel received Stark’s warning, two of the three aircraft carriers based at Pearl Harbor were ordered to ferry new aircraft to bases on Wake and Midway Islands. The first of the two carriers departed for Wake on Nov. 28. The second carrier departed for Midway on Dec. 5. The third carrier was being overhauled in San Diego.
To the question of why he did not have planes in the air patrolling the ocean around Oahu, Kimmel told the committee he had only 49 flyable patrol planes, and all were lacking in spare parts and extra crew. Around the clock reconnaissance, he said, would have required at least 250 planes.
At the same time Pearl Harbor was experiencing a shortage of aircraft and parts, thousands of U.S. planes were being shipped overseas to Allied nations, including the Soviet Union, under the Lend-Lease program.
In his testimony before the Joint Committee, General Short stated the War Department had made him the scapegoat for the disaster. Short said had he been furnished the gist of the decoded Japanese messages, he would have prepared his command for an attack.
As it was, he said he ordered only a watch for sabotage. He said he presumed this was satisfactory since Chief of Staff Marshall had not countermanded the order. Short stated that, had the War Department sent him the information promptly, he would have had four hours to prepare for the attack. “A telephone call to Hawaii would have taken only a few minutes,“ he said.
After interviewing a number of witnesses, including Admiral Kimmel and General Short, the committee concluded its hearings on May 31, 1946. The majority report issued in late June was endorsed by eight of the ten members of the commission. It concluded that the ultimate responsibility for the sneak attack rested on Japan.
The report lifted charges of dereliction of duty against Kimmel and Short but found they had committed serious errors of judgement. The report also absolved President Roosevelt and other high officials of any responsibility for the attack.
A minority report filed by two members of the commission, however, charged that Roosevelt and members of his cabinet knew that war was imminent but wanted Japan to fire the first shot in order to make it easier to get a declaration of war through Congress. The debate continues to this day.
Roger Tryon is a Laurel native. The retired teacher has written a history column for the Cedar County News for over 30 years, now.
